Metaphors are embodied otherwise they would not be metaphors

Abstract

Abstract In an interesting paper, Casasanto, Daniel & Tom Gijssels. 2015. What makes a metaphor an embodied metaphor? Linguistics Vanguard 1(1). 327–337 introduce a skeptical view of recent studies into the embodied character of metaphorical source domains. According to the authors, there cannot be conclusive evidence on the matter thus far, since, for a metaphor to be embodied, specific simulations must be modality-specific and not simply restricted to modality-specific activity brain areas. In line with this, I argue that metaphors reflect a connection between perception, memory, and consciousness (embodied extended mind). The Embodied Extended Mind Theory (EEMT) introduced in this paper is indebted to Active Inference (AIF), a process theory for the comprehension of intelligent agency. EEMT defends the idea that language bears traces of nonlinguistic, bodily acquired information that reflects biological processes of energy exchange and conservation. Therefore, it is assumed that what makes a metaphor embodied is not only the relation between a source domain and a target domain in ad hoc regions in the brain, but the alignment of multiple independent systems during the (re)construction of events. Central to this is the idea that humans use stored perceptual maps, the combination of which permits us to manipulate concepts as part of complex event partitioning.