Leniency Programs and Cartel Organization of Multiproduct Firms

Author:

Dargaud Emilie1,Jacques Armel2

Affiliation:

1. Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2, GATE, UMR 5824, F-69130Ecully, France

2. CEMOI, Université de La Réunion, Faculté de Droit et d’Economie, 15, avenue René Cassin, 97715 Saint-Denis messag cedex 9, Saint-Denis, Réunion, France

Abstract

AbstractWhen multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, they may compartmentalize these agreements by having different individuals manage them so as to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Leniency programs can overcome this strategy but may also lead to procollusive effects for centralized firms. The introduction of US amnesty plus programs can have different competitive effects, and leniency programs may modify firms’ choice of internal structure.

Publisher

Walter de Gruyter GmbH

Subject

Law,General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Reference62 articles.

1. “Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders,”;American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,2015

2. “When Can We Expect a Corporate Leniency Program to Result in Fewer Cartels?,”;Journal of Law and Economics,2015

3. “The Impact of Leniency and Whistle-Blowing Programs on Cartels,”;International Journal of Industrial Organization,2006

4. “Optimal Law Enforcement and Criminal Organization,”;Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2007

5. “Optimal Antitrust Policy Under Different Regimes of Fines;International Journal of Industrial Organization,2001

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