Of Mountains, Rivers, and Oceans: Geographic Effects on Military Expenditures, 1961–2012

Abstract

Abstract While much work has been completed analyzing the role of territory’s effect on conflict. Less work has demonstrated how territory affects military budgets. I argue that a state’s defense spending is subsidized by clearly defined geographic focal points. Using geographic data, I show that states clearly defined by rivers and oceans spend less money on defense budgets as a proportion of GDP because the prospects of conflict are lower and internal social cohesion is higher, decreasing the need for large standing militaries for repression/expansion/defense. I contend that this effect is exogenous to threat. On the other hand, more mountainous states should spend more on defense due to increased costs of defense and decreased sense of identity among local populations. Situating this debate within the state development literature helps us answer important questions regarding state formation/consolidation and peaceful interactions with neighbors.