Author:
Schnietz Karen E.,Nieman Timothy
Abstract
In 1997, President Clinton became the first President not awarded fast-track trade negotiating authority since this congressional delegation of trade policymaking authority first began in 1934. Fast-track's failure also represents a case of an unsuccessful business political strategy since business supporters of the measure were easily defeated by labor and environmental opponents, despite the many political ‘privileges’ that business possessed. This case study describes why fast-track is important to the future of US and global trade policy and examines the main reasons for its failure. In doing so, it illustrates theories of pivotal politics, the median voter, collective action, issue framing, international trade's welfare costs and benefits, and international relations that often arise in research and courses on the non-market environment of business, international trade, and international political economy.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Industrial relations
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