Affiliation:
1. The American University in Cairo, AUC New Cairo, Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud Hall (HUSS) , Room 1073 , Cairo , Egypt 11835
Abstract
Abstract
Many philosophers believe that there are both particulars and universals. Many of these philosophers, in turn, believe that universals are immanent. On this view, universals are wholly located where their instances are located. Both Douglas Ehring and E.J. Lowe have argued that immanent universals do not exist on the grounds that nothing can be wholly located in multiple places simultaneously without contradiction. In this paper, I focus on Lowe’s argument, which has received far less attention in the literature. Using the theory of location found in Josh Parsons (2007), I show how Lowe’s argument against immanent universals can be resisted.
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