Why truth is necessarily pragmatic

Abstract

Abstract This essay presents an array of arguments demonstrating that truth is necessarily pragmatic. Evaluations of truth derive from human experience, from the individual’s weltanschauung which molds their point of view and ideological perspective. Consequently, within any community, there exist alternative truths. Traditional takes on truth are reviewed. The fuzziness of many truths is examined. The existence within the community of alternative, sometimes contradictory, truths is explicated and shown to be fairly common in practice, even though it can occasionally lead to social dissension. The essay expatiates on the alleged incontrovertibility of logical, mathematical, and scientific truths (supposedly true in all possible worlds) showing that they are necessarily subject to specific conditions which render the assessment pragmatic. In sum, Φ is true resolves into Φ functions as true under specific conditions a 1…n . Certainly, a hegemonic group within the community will often assert a preference for one truth over its alternatives, but that does not eliminate the existence of alternative truths within that community. The only way to manage this state of affairs is to admit that truth does not exist independent of human beings but is necessarily evaluated according to the set of perceptions, conceptions, and beliefs that constitute the individual’s weltanschauung at the time the judgment is made, such that different weltanschauungen often give rise to different judgments about what functions as true.