Affiliation:
1. Department of Economics , University of Milan - Bicocca , Milano , Italy
Abstract
Abstract
A decision maker solicits information from two partially informed experts and then makes a choice under uncertainty. The experts can be either moderately or extremely biased relative to the decision maker, which is their private information. I investigate the incentives of the experts to share their private information with the decision maker and analyze the resulting effects on information transmission. I show that it may be optimal to consult a single expert rather than two experts if the decision maker is sufficiently concerned about taking advice from extremely biased experts. In contrast to what may be expected, this result suggests that getting a second opinion may not always be helpful for decision making.
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Cited by
2 articles.
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1. To Save Mobile Crowdsourcing From Cheap-Talk: A Game Theoretic Learning Approach;IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing;2024-08
2. To Save Crowdsourcing from Cheap-Talk: Strategic Learning from Biased Users;2023 21st International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks (WiOpt);2023-08-24