Abstract
AbstractThis study addresses the problem of Arrovian preference aggregation. Social rationality plays a crucial role in the standard Arrovian framework. However, no assumptions on social rationality are imposed here. Social preferences are allowed to be any binary relation (possibly incomplete and intransitive). We introduce the axiom of hybrid invariance, which requires that if social preferences under two preference profiles make the same judgment, then a social preference under a “hybrid” of the two profiles must extend the original judgment in a certain way. Then, we characterize the structure of decisive coalitions under hybrid invariance.
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
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