Pretrial Beliefs and Verdict Accuracy: Costly Juror Effort and Free Riding

Author:

Guha Brishti1

Affiliation:

1. Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi110067, India

Abstract

AbstractIf jurors care about reaching the correct verdict, but also experience costs to paying attention during the trial, even a small effort cost generates interesting interactions between pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy. I demonstrate the existence of a strong free riding effect; jurors respond to a more informative prior by reducing their probabilities of paying attention, to the extent that over a non-empty range, a more informative prior will be associated with poorer verdicts. Pretrial beliefs can depend on several factors: I consider two – the extent of discovery during the pre-plea bargaining process, and the efficiency of the police. My results imply that more liberal discovery rules, which result in a less noisy plea bargaining process, will actually be complemented by greater juror effort over a range, resulting in more accurate verdicts. In contrast, greater police efficiency will, over a range, elicit a sufficient drop in juror effort such that verdicts are less accurate. Thus, improving discovery has added benefits over a range, while the benefits of exogenous improvements in policing may be dampened. I briefly extend the model to cases where attentive jurors receive an imperfect public signal instead of a perfect one, and to cases where jurors’ utilities from convicting a guilty defendant differ from their utilities from acquitting an innocent one.

Publisher

Walter de Gruyter GmbH

Subject

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Reference64 articles.

1. Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting;American Political Science Review,1998

2. Committee Design with Endogenous Information;Review of Economic Studies,2004

3. Rational Ignorance and Voting Behavior;International Journal of Game Theory,2007

4. Ethical Voters and Costly Information Acquisition;Quarterly Journal of Political Science,2006

5. Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs;RAND Journal of Economics,1986

Cited by 3 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Plea bargaining when juror effort is costly;Economic Theory;2024-02-14

2. Accomplice plea bargains in the presence of costly juror effort;Games and Economic Behavior;2023-11

3. Plea Bargaining when Juror Effort is Costly;SSRN Electronic Journal;2021

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3