Abstract
AbstractThis paper addresses conflicts between two groups when trying to win a group-specific public good prize. We analyze how these contests are affected when groups are led by an organizer with the capacity to impose transfers to share the costs of individual efforts within the group. The technology of conflict that we use is the
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
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