Affiliation:
1. Debeka Lebensversicherungsverein a. G., 56058Koblenz, Germany
Abstract
AbstractWe study games with two possibilities for the strategic variable and find that contrary to the Nash equilibrium the evolutionarily stable equilibrium – provided it uniquely exists – does not depend on which possibility is chosen. Our result generalizes recent findings of Satoh, Tanaka and Wagener who studied this issue in various special cases.
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
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2 articles.
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