On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition

Published:2013-01-01 Issue:1 Volume:13 Page:415-428
ISSN:2194-6124
Container-title:The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
language:
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Author:

Doghmi Ahmed¹,Ziad Abderrahmane²

Affiliation:

1. 1Department of Economics and Finance, National Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics, Madinat Al Irfane, Rabat Institutes, 10100 Rabat, Morocco; University of Caen, Center for Research in Economics and Management (UMR CNRS 6211), 19 Rue Claude Bloch 14032 Caen, Cedex, France

2. 2Department of Economics, University of Caen, Center for Research in Economics and Management (UMR CNRS 6211), 19 Rue Claude Bloch 14032 Caen, Cedex, France

Abstract

AbstractIn this article, we study the problem of Nash implementation in private good economies with single-peaked, single-plateaued, and single-dipped preferences in the presence of at least one minimally honest agent. We prove that all solutions of the problem of fair division satisfying unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria as long as there are at least three agents participating in the mechanism (game form). To justify this result, we provide a list of solutions which violate the condition of no-veto power.

Publisher

Walter de Gruyter GmbH

Subject

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Link

https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0028/pdf

Reference34 articles.

1. Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents;Lombardi;Working Paper, Hitotsubashi University,2012

2. Nash Implementation in Exchange Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences;Doghmi;Economics Letters,2008

3. Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies When Preferences Are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations;Doghmi;Mathematical Economics Letters.,2013

4. Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences;Doghmi;Working Paper,2013

5. Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory;Matsushima;Economics Letters,2008b

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