Affiliation:
1. Department of Economics , University of Florence , via delle Pandette 9, 50127 Florence , Italy
Abstract
Abstract
We study an economy where a school can target grades according to students’social groups, and privileged students are more likely to obtain a high academic achievement. In this context, we analyse the welfare effects of introducing alternative policies. Banning targeted grading generally maximises welfare, through an increase in the wage of privileged students. This result does not hold though when the proportion of high achievers is large, and labour demand is high. In this case, banning wage discrimination among social groups maximises welfare, through an increase in the wages of underprivileged students.
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Reference36 articles.
1. Allahar, A., and J. Côté. 2007. The Ivory Tower Blues, 195–98. Toronto: University of Toronto.
2. Arrow, K. J. 1973. “The Theory of Statistical Discrimination.” In Discrimination in Labor Markets, edited by Ashenfelter and Rees. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
3. Bar, T., V. Kadiyali, and A. Zussman. 2012. “Put Grades in Context.” Journal of Labor Economics 30 (2): 445–78.
4. Burgess, S., and E. Greaves. 2013. “Test Scores, Subjective Assessment and Stereotyping of Ethnic Minorities.” Journal of Labor Economics 31: 535–76.
5. Carneiro, P., and J. J. Heckman. 2003. “Human Capital Policy”. In Inequality in America: What Role for Human Capital Policies?, edited by J. J. Heckman, and A. B. Krueger. The MIT Press.
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Sorting and Grading;Journal of the European Economic Association;2024-05-28
2. Academic achievement and tracking – a theory based on grading standards;Education Economics;2020-08-24