The Role of Judges in Selecting Efficient Norms in a Common Law System: A Law and Economics Perspective

Abstract

Abstract This study delves into the common law efficiency theory, proposing that the efficiency of legal norms in common law systems predominantly depends on judges’ biases towards efficiency. By developing an economic model, it is demonstrated that the proportion of efficient norms correlates with the predisposition of judges towards efficiency, influenced by their personal beliefs. Historical analysis of common and civil law systems reveals that neither inherently guarantees efficiency; rather, their efficiency is contingent upon their adaptability to societal needs and prevailing judicial ideologies. The paper concludes that the efficiency of a legal system relies on its congruence with societal values and judicial ideologies, emphasizing that shifts in the judiciary’s ideological makeup have implications on legal system efficiency. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of the multifaceted process shaping legal norms in common law, highlighting the critical role of judges, societal values, and legislative dynamics.