The Cypriot Doctrine of Necessity and the Amendment of the Cypriot Constitution: The Revision of the Unamendable Amendment Rules of the Cypriot Constitution Through a Juridical Coup D’ État

Abstract

Abstract The constitutional design and the complete inability of the two ethnic communities who live in Cyprus (Greeks and Turks) to share the power according to the constitutional rules concluded soon after the independence to a constitutional crisis and consequently to the collapse of the system of governance that the Constitution provided, since the Turk-Cypriots withdraw from all their posts in key state institutions. The Supreme Court, in order to confront the issue that the part of the Constitution which set the system of governance became inoperative, implemented the ‘Doctrine of Necessity’, according to which the constitutional provisions that prescribe the bi-communal composition of all key institutions are suspended until the crisis comes to an end. The implementation of the Doctrine of Necessity did not leave intact the amendment formula of the Cypriot Constitution, which demands two separate majorities by 2/3rds of each community MPs for the conclusion of the process. However, such implementation of a judge-made standard to the amendment process raises crucial issues regarding the possibility of making clear-cut distinctions between constituent and constituted power, formal and informal constitutional change and about the legitimation of judges to revise through interpretation the amendment rules that the Constitution prescribes.