Platonische Ideen als hybride Gegenstände

Abstract

Abstract Aristotle famously criticizes Plato for confusing in his conceptions of immutable, atemporal and paradigmatic Forms things of two completely different ontological types, i. e. universals and particulars. My aim, in this text, is to reveal the Platonic background of this Aristotelian criticism. Although I generally agree with Aristotle’s diagnosis of the hybrid character of Platonic Forms, I will show that it is important to distinguish between real difficulties of Plato’s conception of Forms and alleged shortcomings that might permit, nonetheless, a plausible interpretation. I start from a brief description of three essential functions which can only be adequately fulfilled by Forms according to Plato. Then, I determine the ontological status of Forms, firstly, as kinds of abstract objects (comparable to Fregean concepts), and, secondly, as paradigmatic particulars. In conclusion, I agree with Aristotle on the hybrid character of Forms, but I am less pessimistic with regard to the unintelligibility of the two different natures of Forms individually.