Lust, die glücklich macht

Abstract

Abstract Against the still prevalent assumption according to which Kant’s moral philosophy does not, at least for sensuous rational agents, provide a satisfactory answer to the problem posed by their need of happiness, the present paper develops the following argument: The subject must be able to interrupt her pursuit of happiness - precisely in order not to game away her happiness. Within the horizon of Kant’s doctrine of moral incentives as well as in a secular reading of his conception of the highest good, one can see, first, that the possibility of a morally motivated interruption of the pursuit of happiness is a necessary condition precisely for the happiness of finite but rational agents; second, that sensuous satisfaction must be understood as an integrative component of the highest good and, as such, as a second necessary condition for happiness. Kant’s notion of the highest good, thus, conceptualizes the coincidence of virtue and lust as a sufficient condition of happiness, by which a morally mediated lust becomes possible that not only provides sensuous satisfaction, but also makes us happy.