Zwischen ethischer Neutralität und Dehumanisierung

Author:

Rüther Markus1

Affiliation:

1. Forschungszentrum Jülich , 52425 Jülich , Germany

Abstract

Abstract It is an undoubted fact that neuroscientific models of explanation play a crucial role in the realms of science and public life. Besides some noteworthy theoretical problems (unserious experimental set-ups, mis- or overinterpretation, illegitimate analogies, etc.) there are also practical problems concerning the neuroscientific explanation monopoly. To bring those problems to light, it is reasonable to concentrate on a specific and currently prominent version of modelling – namely that undertaken by so-called biological psychiatry. In this article, it will be shown that the controversy concerning biological psychiatry is often guided by several misunderstandings and wrong-headed accusations. The article starts by giving a minimal definition of biological psychiatry which can be used as a common ground for further argumentation. It differentiates three subprojects of biological psychiatry and examines their risks and potentials in more detail. In sum, the article argues for a nuanced attitude towards biological psychiatry: If we are concerned with diagnostic practices and biological underpinnings of mental illnesses we are well-informed by the methods of biological psychiatry. However, if we want to know something about the nature of mental illnesses, we should imagine other projects which are theoretically much better equipped to answer ontological questions.

Publisher

Walter de Gruyter GmbH

Subject

Philosophy

Reference47 articles.

1. Banner, N. F. (2013), Mental disorders are not brain disorders, in: Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19.3, 509–513.

2. Broome, M. R., u. Bortolotti, L. (2009), Mental Illness as Mental: In Defence of Psychological Realism, in: HumanaMente 11, 25–44.

3. Button, K., et al. (2012), Power failure: why small sample size undermines the reliability of neuroscience, in: Nature Reviews Neuroscience 14, 365–376.

4. FitzPatrick, W. (2004), Totipotency and the Moral Status of the Embryos: New Problems for an Old Argument, in: Journal of Social Philosophy 35.1, 108–122.

5. FitzPatrick, W. (2008), Robust Ethical Realism, Non-Naturalism and Normativity, in: Shafer-Landau, R. (Hg.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3, Oxford, 159–205.

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3