Author:
Kantorowicz-Reznichenko Elena
Abstract
AbstractFines are an efficient method of sanctioning since the burden on the taxpayer for enforcing it is low and the offender is transferring wealth to society. However, using law-and-economics analysis, this paper suggests that the day-fine is a superior model to other forms of fines. This pecuniary measure takes into account the income of the offender and the severity of the offense. Consequently, criminals with different socioeconomic status committing the same crime would pay the same portion of their wealth but not the same absolute amount of money. Using this structure, the day-fine has a potential to deter equally both the rich and the poor and to avoid the costly sanction of imprisonment.
Subject
Law,General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
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