Anapole-enabled RFID security against far-field attacks

Abstract

Abstract Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a widely used wireless technology for contactless data exchange. Owing to international standardization and one-way security nature of the communication protocol, RFID tags, holding sensitive information, may be a subject to theft. One of the major security loopholes is the so-called far-field attack, where unauthorized interrogation is performed from a distance, bypassing the user’s verification. This loophole is a penalty of using a dipole-like RFID tag antenna, leaking wireless information to the far-field. Here we introduce a new concept of anapole-enabled security, prohibiting far-field attacks by utilizing fundamental laws of physics. Our design is based on radiationless electromagnetic states (anapoles), which have high near-field concentration and theoretically nulling far-field scattering. The first property enables performing data readout from several centimeters (near-field), while the second prevents attacks from a distance, regardless an eavesdropper’s radiated power and antenna gain. Our realization is based on a compact 3 cm high-index ceramic core–shell structure, functionalized with a thin metal wire and an integrated circuit to control the tag. Switching scheme was designed to provide a modulation between two radiation-less anapole states, blocking both up and down links for a far-field access. The anapole tag demonstrates more than 20 dB suppression of far-field interrogation distance in respect with a standard commercial tag, while keeping the near-field performance at the same level. The proposed concept might significantly enhance the RFID communication channel in cases, where information security prevails over cost constrains.