1. On the relationship of Kierkegaard to Pascal see Allen, E. I. “Pascal and Kierkegaard”,London Quarterly and Holborn ReviewCLXII (April 1937), pp. 150–164.
2. All reference in this paper are to the following editions:Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated by W. Lowrie and D. Swenson (Princeton University Press, 1968);Philosophical Fragments(new edition), translated by D. Swenson, new introduction by N. Thulstrup, translation revised by H. Hong (Princeton University Press, 1974);De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, translated by T. H. Croxall (Stanford University Press, 1967).
3. There are many references to Greek skepticism thoughout CUP (See pp. 75,280,299), though it is hard to say precisely what Greek skeptics Kierkegaard read, and what he considers as the core of the skeptical position. (He says at one point: “All skepticism isa kind of idealism”, p. 315.)
4. On the Kierkegaard-Hegel dispute see James Bogen “Remark on the Kierkegaard-Hegel Controversy”,SyntheseXIII (1961), pp. 372–389. For a basic representation of Kierkegaard's attack on Hegel see A. MacIntyre, “Kierkegaard”, in P. Edwards (ed.),The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, IV(New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 336–340.
5. The term “immediacy” that Kierkegaard uses so often is part of the technical jargon that Kierkegaard owes to the Hegelian tradition, though the meaning of the term in Kierkegaard's work is quite different from Hegel's. For Kierkegaard, “immediate existence” is the raw material of the experiences of life, before consciousness doubles back on itself through the mediation of thought and language. On this issue see Louis Mackey, “The Poetry of Inwardness”, inKierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by J. Thompson (New York: Anchor Books, 1972).