1. Cf.Jacques Derrida:Speech and Phenomena; and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 103.
2. Cf.Plato:Timaeus, 37d.
3. It is worth noting that the idea of eternity as a form of duration is not that novel, nor indeed peculiar to Husserl alone but can be traced back to Parmenides. We here allude to Michael Theunissen's reading of Parmenides’ notion of being as an unlimited form or duration. Theunissen draws on Fragment 8 lines 5–6a: “oὐδέ πoτ ἠν oὐδ ἕσται, ἐπεì νũν ἕστιν ὁμoũ πᾶν ἕν συνεχές” which can be translated as either: “It [Being] neither was nor will be, since it is now together as a whole, one, continuous” or “Neither was it at one time, nor will it be (at some time)”. This leads Theunissen to observe: “According to the first reading, that is, Parmenides intends to negate the temporal difference between past and future; according to the second he is not at all interested in denying modal differences in time but merely wants to negate a passing away settled in the past and a coming to be located in the future. If the first reading credits the Eleatic with carrying through a conceptually adequate intention of timelessness, the second assumes he indeed aimed for timelessness but in fact achieved only unlimited duration” (Michael Theunissen: “Metaphysics’ Forgetfulness of Time: On the Controversy over Parmenides, Frag. 8,5” inPhilosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment, eds. A. Honneth, T. McCarthy, C. Offe & A. Wellmer, translated by William Rehg, Camb. Mass: MIT Press, 1992, p. 6). I should like to thank my colleague Peter Osborne for drawing my attention to this article.
4. Cf. e.g.Phaedo, 77c.
5. As Descartes argues: “The first [resolution] was never to accept anything as true if I did not have evident knowledge of its truth: that is, carefully to avoid precipitate conclusions and preconceptions, and to include nothing more in my judgement than what presented itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that I had no occasion to doubt it” (René Descartes: “Discourse on Method” inThe Philosophical Writings of Descartes Vol. I, trans, by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, Part Two, p. 120/18 (in the margin).