1. For the sake of brevity, this presentation does not include a criticism of Windelband and Rickert. I discuss the merits of their philosophy in the context of Heidegger's critique.
2. See Passmore (1970, 48), von Aster (1935, 4), Frischeisen-Köhler (1924, 553), Adickes (1911, 219). An interesting account of the material conditions of the revitalization of philosophy is given in Köhmke (1993, especially pp. 302–365).
3. Windelband must have been unaware of Frege's Begriffsschrift (1879), in which the content stroke is distinguished from the judgment stroke in a way that is roughly similar to Windelband's distinction of judgment and evaluation. As far as theword“truth value” is concerned, it appears that Windelband used it in these logical contexts prior to Frege. But Windelband never developed aconceptof truth resembling anything like the one employed in Frege's later writings on the theory of reference.
4. If one recalls Heidegger's own rich analysis of the Ought—under the heading of the call of conscience in Being and Time (¶56)—, one understands that Heidegger's critique of Rickert and Windelband is driven by a genuine interest in the matter, the structure of the Ought.
5. He does not give examples for the latter. When Heidegger also claims that the “is” and “ought” are related only through “absolute difference” without any “positive connection” (1987, 54), he does not endorse this view. Rather, this is the unwelcome result of the value-philosophical separation of “is” and “ought”. The gap between “is” and “ought” opened by value philosophy comes to haunt it; it cannot bridge this gap, although the realization of values requires some closing of the gap.