1. References to the Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, theCritique of Practical Reason, and theCritique of Judgementare abbreviated, C1, C2, and C3 respectively. Other abbreviations to Kant's works areProlegomena to any Future Metaphysics (PFM), Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MFNS), Metaphysical Principles of Virtue (MPV), What is Enlightenment (WE), Dreams of a Spirit Seer (DS), and the Long Introduction to theCritique of Judgement (LIC3).References to Heidegger'sBeing and Timeare in Heidegger's pagination (e.g.BTH 215). Other abbreviations areBasic Problems of Phenomenomogy (BP), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (KPM), Introduction to Metaphysics (IM), andWhat is a Thing? (WT).References to the Davos Lecture dialogue between Heidegger and Cassirer are abbreviatedDL.
2. Heidegger's Kant interpretation, like his history of philosophy generally, has been much criticized, for his admitted interpretative “violence”. But Heideggerian violence is different in degree and kind from the violence common in the scientistic appropriation of Kant. Kant says unequivocally that there can be no empirical science of the soul (MFNS, p. 8). Kitcher divines that he didn't really mean it (1987, p. 206; 1990a, p. 209n21). Kant makes no mention whatsoever of cognitive mechanisms, and “absolutely denies” mechanistic accounts, even of a blade of grass (C3, sect. 75) let alone higher intelligence (see McDonough, 1995b, 1996). Kitcher says that Kant is “offering hypotheses about the mechanisms that carry out [cognitive] tasks” (1987, p. 215; 1990b, p. 206; etc.). Kant, she says, is doing [mechanistic] psychology despite himself’ (1987, p. 214). Despite Kant's claim that his project isa prioriand transcendental, Kitcher holds that it is really empirical (1987, pp. 22, 44, etc.),…etc. The difference between Heideggerian violence and this scientistic violence is that Heidegger insists that his interpretative license must be based on potentialities inherent in the historical text itself, whereas the standardized scientistic violence is based on potentialities inherent in the scientistic project—so that the historical text becomes a mere means for the reinforcement of the scientistic project.
3. Compare with (McDonough, 1989, p. 20 & 1991a, p. 286).
4. Kant's emphasis on non-natural spontaneity even traces back to his pre-critical period: “It follows…that the state of all that is material isdependentandconstrained[K's emphasis], whereas…those natures whose own power of will is capable of spontaneously determining and modifying itself—such natures can hardly be of a material nature…. At any rate those immaterial beings which contain the ground of animal life are different from those which comprise reason in their spontaneous activity and are called spirits (Dreams of a Spirit Seer, p. 315n*).
5. See (McDonough, 1990, p. 264).