Abstract
AbstractMuch recent work on self-knowledge has been inspired by the idea that the ‘transparency’ of questions about our own mental states to questions about the non-mental world holds the key to understanding how privileged self-knowledge is possible. I critically discuss some prominent recent accounts of such transparency, and argue for a Sartrean interpretation of the phenomenon, on which this knowledge is explained by our capacity to transform an implicit or ‘non-positional’ self-awareness into reflective, ‘positional’ self-knowledge.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Reference23 articles.
1. Judgment as a Guide to Belief;Silins;In Smithies and Stoljar,2012
2. Byrne A. 2011. “Transparency, Belief, Intention.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LXXXV, 201–221.
3. Knowing What I See
Cited by
18 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献