Author:
Gallagher Shaun,Varela Francisco J.
Abstract
In recent years there has been some hard-won but still limited agreement
that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance to the
cognitive sciences. This realization comes in the wake of dismissive
gestures made by philosophers of mind who mistakenly associate
phenomenological method with untrained psychological introspection (e.g.,
Dennett 1991). For very different reasons, resistance is also found on the
phenomenological side of this issue. There are many thinkers well versed in
the Husserlian tradition who are not willing to consider the validity of a
naturalistic science of mind. For them cognitive science is too
computational or too reductionistic to be seriously considered as capable of
explaining experience or consciousness. In some cases, when phenomenologists
have seriously engaged the project of the cognitive sciences, rather than
pursing a positive rapprochement with this project, they have been satisfied
in drawing critical lines that identify its limitations.
On the one hand, such negative attitudes are understandable from the
perspective of the Husserlian rejection of naturalism, or from strong
emphasis on the transcendental current in phenomenology.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
General Earth and Planetary Sciences,General Environmental Science
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