Abstract
According to the Asymmetry, we’ve strong moral reason to prevent miserable lives from coming into existence, but no moral reason to bring happy lives into existence. This procreative asymmetry is often thought to be part of commonsense morality, however theoretically puzzling it might prove to be. I argue that this is a mistake. The Asymmetry is merely prima facie intuitive, and loses its appeal on further reflection. Mature commonsense morality recognizes no fundamental procreative asymmetry. It may recognize some superficially similar theses, but we will see that they derive from more familiar principles, and are compatible with there being moral reason to bring happy lives into existence.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Cited by
22 articles.
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1. Lecture Three;Philosophy for an Ending World;2024-04-01
2. Lecture Two;Philosophy for an Ending World;2024-04-01
3. Lecture One;Philosophy for an Ending World;2024-04-01
4. Second Debate;Philosophy for an Ending World;2024-04-01
5. First Debate;Philosophy for an Ending World;2024-04-01