Abstract
AbstractSchechtman’s ‘Person Life View’ (PLV) offers an account of personal identity whereby persons are the unified loci of our practical and ethical judgment. PLV also recognises infants and permanent vegetative state patients as being persons. I argue that the way PLV handles these cases yields an unexpected result: the dead also remain persons, contrary to the widely-accepted ‘Termination Thesis.’ Even more surprisingly, this actually counts in PLV’s favor: in light of our social and ethical practices which treat the dead as moral patients, PLV gives a more plausible account of the status of the dead than its rival theories.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Cited by
6 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. A Defense of the Obligation to Keep Promises to the Dead;The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine;2024-09-08
2. Relational nonhuman personhood;The Southern Journal of Philosophy;2023-09-07
3. Governing ghostbots;Computer Law & Security Review;2023-04
4. Speak no ill of the dead: the dead as a social group;Synthese;2022-05-06
5. Value after death;Ratio;2022-03-28