Affiliation:
1. The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Chapel
Hill, North Carolina, USA,
Abstract
Many scholars have examined terrorism as a conflict between a state and a nonstate actor. However, during terrorist campaigns, terrorists often seek sanctuary from target attacks by crossing into foreign host states. This action effectively transforms the conflict from a purely domestic contest into an international issue. This paper explores why terrorist organizations make the choice to internationalize conflicts by adopting a foreign host. Further, this paper examines why host governments accept terrorist organizations. To address these questions, this research develops a simple game theoretic model to explain the decision to internationalize terrorism. The paper concludes with an empirical test of the model's predictions.
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Economics and Econometrics
Cited by
53 articles.
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