The Empirical Basis for Antitrust: Cartels, Mergers, and Remedies-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The Empirical Basis for Antitrust: Cartels, Mergers, and Remedies

Published:2017-01-27 Issue:2 Volume:24 Page:233-250
ISSN:1357-1516
Container-title:International Journal of the Economics of Business
language:en
Short-container-title:International Journal of the Economics of Business

Author:

Langenfeld James¹

Affiliation:

1. Navigant Economics, 1200 19th St. NW, Washington, DC 20036, USA

Publisher

Informa UK Limited

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)

Link

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13571516.2017.1279376

Reference25 articles.

1. AAI (American Antitrust Institute). Forthcoming. Mergers, Market Power, and the Need for More Vigorous Enforcement. InTransition Report to the 45th President of the United States. Washington, DC: Author.

2. Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers

3. A RETROSPECTIVE ON MERGER RETROSPECTIVES IN THE UNITED STATES

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