1. See Claude & Weston (eds) Human Rights in the World Community (1989) 17–18; Bertus de Villiers ‘Social and Economic Rights’ in Van Wyk, Dugard, De Villiers and Davis Rights and Constitutionalism: the New South African Legal Order (1994) 599 603; Sandra Liebenberg ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its Implications for South Africa’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 359 361–2; Pierre de Vos ‘The economic and social rights of children and South Africa's Constitution’ (1995) SA Public Law 233 at 235–8. As will become obvious from my arguments in this article, I do not subscribe to the (to my mind) artificial distinction between ‘first’, ‘second’ and ‘third’ generation rights. The use of similar terminology throughout this article should therefore not be seen as an endorsement of this distinction, but merely as a practical necessity.
2. In 1950 the General Assembly adopted a resolution (Res 421 (V) of 4 December 1950) in which it emphasized the interdependence of all categories of human rights and called upon the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to adopt a single Convention. The next year, the Western states were able to reverse the decision, asking the Commission to divide the rights contained in the UDHR into two separate international covenants. See General Assembly resolution 543 (VI) of 5 February 1952. See also Asbjorn Eide ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in Eide, Crause & Rosas (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: a Textbook (1995) 21 22; and Liebenberg supra note 2, at 360–1.