1. On this point see Susan Neiman. The Unity of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1994) and Richard L. Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). More generally, see Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1987).
2. The following three collections may be regarded as summaries of the rationality debates which took place in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s: Bryan R. Wilson (ed.) Rationality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1970): Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds) Rationality and Relativism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982): and Michael Krausz (ed.) Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1989). One will be hard pressed to find in these collections a sustained discussion of reason in terms of freedom and self-determination. In every case the principal focus is on the possibility or impossibility of non-local standards of truth and what that entails for the practice and self-understanding of the sciences.
3. Of course, the epistemological construal of reason expresses its own ideal of freedom and self-determination. But this ideal of freedom and self-determination depends on what Charles Taylor has called an Ontology of disengagement", giving the epistemological construal of reason its apparently irresistible attraction. See Taylor's Overcoming Epistemology'. in his Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
4. Hilary Putnam, Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 254. my italics. Hereafter cited as RHF in parentheses.
5. Richard Rorty, 'Linger. Castoriadis, and the Romance of a National Future', in Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Hereafter cited as EHO in parentheses.