A symmetric capacity-constrained differentiated oligopoly model for the United States pediatric vaccine market with linear demand-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

A symmetric capacity-constrained differentiated oligopoly model for the United States pediatric vaccine market with linear demand

Published:2015-03-06 Issue:11 Volume:47 Page:1252-1266
ISSN:0740-817X
Container-title:IIE Transactions
language:en
Short-container-title:IIE Transactions

Author:

Behzad Banafsheh,Jacobson Sheldon H.,Robbins Matthew J.

Publisher

Informa UK Limited

Subject

Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering

Link

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/0740817X.2015.1009759

Reference43 articles.

1. Behzad, B. and Jacobson, S. (2014) Asymmetric Bertrand–Edgeworth–Chamberlin competition: a pediatric vaccine pricing model. Technical report, University of Illinois.

2. Market Size and Substitutability in Imperfect Competition: A Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin Model

3. Limited knowledge of demand and oligopoly equilibria

4. Product Differentiation in a Bertrand–Edgeworth Duopoly

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