The Effects of Amount of Processing on Recall and Recognition

Abstract

Johnson-Laird, Gibbs and de Mowbray (1978) and Ross (1981) have argued that amount of processing, as indexed by the overall number of decisions a subject makes, provides a good predictor of incidental memory performance. Conversely, McClelland, Rawles and Sinclair (1981) have provided evidence that it is normally the number of positive decisions rather than the overall number of decisions per se that determines level of recall. The present study replicated and extended the findings of McClelland and his colleagues. In free recall (Experiment 1 and 3), cued recall (Experiment 3) and recognition in the presence or absence of context cues (Experiments 2 and 3), an account based on number of positive decisions provided by far the better explanation. Experiment 3 also revealed that the experimental manipulations had a somewhat greater effect on recall than recognition. This is explained in terms of Tulving and Pearlstone's (1966) distinction between availability and accessibility. It is suggested that words associated with negative decisions are not only less accessible in memory, there are also fewer of them available for recall and recognition.