1. Re Brounsall(1778) 2 Cowp 829; 98 ER 1385: “It is not by way of punishment; but the court on such cases, exercise their discretion, whether a man whom they have formerly admitted, is a proper person to be continued on the roll or not”;Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association(1960) 104 CLR 186 at 201–2: “a disbarring order is in no sense punitive in character. When such an order is made, it is made, from the public point of view, for the protection of those who require protection, and from the professional point of view, in order that abuse of privilege may not lead to loss of privilege“; the protective function was perhaps most vehemently stated inNew South Wales Bar Association v Evatt(1968) 117 CLR 177 at 183–4 where the High Court of Australia said: “The power of the Court to discipline a barrister is, however,entirely protective, and, notwithstanding that its exercise may involve a great deprivation to the person disciplined, there isnoelement of punishment involved” [emphasis added];Smith v NSW Bar Association(1992) 176 CLR 256 at 270perDeane J.
2. Re a Solicitor(1992) 110 FLR 9 at 24;Law Society of New South Wales v Bannister(1993) 4 LPDR 24. Such comments can be seen in Queensland cases:Attorney-General v Bax[1999] 2 QdR 9 at 21perPincus JA, cited with approval inQLS v Carberry; A-G v Carberry[2000] QCA 450 (3 November 2000) at [38] per Moynihan SJA and Atkinson J. In the context of discipline of medical practitioners, seeRe A Medical Practitioner[1995] 2 Qd R 154 at 164perDowsett J.
3. [1883] 18 L Jo 352.
4. Re M, a Solicitor[1938] St R Qd 454 at 461 citingRe Farman[1883] 18 L Jo 352.
5. [1938] St R Qd 454 at 461.