Compensation regulation and political promotion of executives of state-owned enterprises——Quasi-natural experiment based on the reform of compensation regulation in China-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Compensation regulation and political promotion of executives of state-owned enterprises——Quasi-natural experiment based on the reform of compensation regulation in China

Published:2021-10-02 Issue:4 Volume:9 Page:549-570
ISSN:2169-7213
Container-title:China Journal of Accounting Studies
language:en
Short-container-title:China Journal of Accounting Studies

Author:

Bai Jun¹,Li Chuang²,Li Shasha³,Luo Weiting¹

Affiliation:

1. School of Economics and Management Research, Shihezi University, Xinjiang, Shihezi, China

2. School of Economics Accountancy, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China

3. Management College, Ocean University of China, Qingdao, Shandong, China

Funder

National Natural Science Foundation of China

Publisher

Informa UK Limited

Subject

General Business, Management and Accounting,Accounting

Link

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21697213.2022.2082719

Reference50 articles.

1. Economic performance and political mobility: Chinese provincial leaders

2. Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major Shareholder

3. Enlarging the Contracting Space: Collateral Menus, Access to Credit, and Economic Activity

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