1. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, ed. K. Schuhmann, Husserliana III, rev. edn (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 353. English translation by F. Kersten, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Book I: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), p. 364.
2. Plato, Theaetetus, 187c-200d.
3. The inclination to posit a clear-cut distinction between the condition and the experience of error is foreign to the kind of reflection advanced by phenomenology. Yet, this kind of conceptual binarism is so deeply rooted in the philosophical tradition that it appears even in representative interpretations of Husserl's work. See, for example, Izchak Miller's approach to the problem of misperception in Husserl: 'We must distinguish a misperception, whether "exposed" or not, from the experience of misperception. A case of misperception is, simply, a case in which we perceive an object as having a property which it fails, in fact to have. A case of experience of misperception, on the other hand, is a perceptual experience in the course of which we experience a (purported) object which we continually take to be one and the same while we undergo a "change of mind" about one or more of its (purported) abiding qualities. Clearly, we can misperceive without experiencing it as a misperception, and we can experience a misperception even though we are not, in fact, misperceiving. There is, thus no logically necessary connection between the having of the experience of misperception and the having of a misperception.' Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), p. 69.
4. Cf. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, ed. L. Landgrebe (Hamburg: Claassen & G o verts, 1948), sec. 21a, pp. 94-8.
5. Cf. Dagfinn Follesdal's example of seeing a tree: 'As long as our further expe rience remains harmonious, we come to have an ever more confirmed belie that there is a tree in front of us. However, if a conflict arises in this proces if we come to have hyle that are incompatible with our noema, an 'explosio of the noema takes place, and the noema is replaced by a noema of different object. Thus if we go around the tree and find no back side, say no longer that we see a tree, but perhaps that we see a stage prop.' 'Husse Theory of Perception', in Hubert L. Dreyfus (ed.) Husserl, lntentionc and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), p. 95.