1. Barnaby, F. and Ter Borg, M. 1986.Emerging Technologies and Military Doctrine: A Political Assessment276London: Macmillan. Cited in (p.
2. Although the military utility of passive defenses is widely recognized and highly cost effective, they are politically difficult to implement in Germany because, like the Berlin Wall, they are seen as physical manifestations of the division of the two Germanies. The fact that the Germans are so willing to sacrifice military utility for political symbolism suggests that they are very relaxed about the military threat from the East. Interestingly there has not been a great deal of emphasis on disengagement zones in the NPD literature. In fact such zones could be highly stabilizing—especially if pre-positioned supplies (ammunition, fuel, bridging equipment, etc.) were kept out of the zones making blitzkrieg-type tactics extraordinarily difficult.
3. See Anders Boserup, “The Strategy of Non-Offensive Defence,”Working PaperNo. 2 (Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, 1986) for an extended discussion of the no-target goal.
4. Hans W. Hoffman, Reiner K. Huber and Karl Steiger, “On Reactive Defense Options: A Comparative Systems Analysis of Alternatives for the Initial Defense Against the First Strategic Echelon of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe,” Institut für Angewandte Systemforschung und Operations Research, Hochschule der Bundeswehr München, Berich Nr. S-8403, November 1984.