1. Joint Publications Research Service,Arms Control(henceforthJPRS TAC), 95–009-L, April 6, 1995; Stephen Blank, “Yevgeny Primakov and Russia's Proliferation Strategy: What We Should Expect,” forthcoming inThe Monitor, Georgia University, Athens, GA, 1999.
2. David S. Cloud, “Warheadache,”Nezu Republic, April 20, 1998, pp. 11–12.
3. Felgengauer, Pavel. 1997.Russia in the World Arms Trade87–105. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “An Uneasy Partnership: Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation and Arms Sales,” Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitri V. Trenin, eds.
4. Blank, “Yevgeny Primakov and Russia's Proliferation Strategy.”
5. For the case of suspected chemical weapons transfers see Al J. Venter, “Enemies and Allies in the Land of Assad,”Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1998, p. 30. There is also evidence that Russian firms negotiated with Iraq to sell Iraq dual-use technologies and goods that could be used for biological warfare with the clear understanding that this is what Iraq was seeking. See R. Jeffrey Smith's two articles: “Did Russia Sell Iraq Germ Warfare Equipment?”Washington Post, February 12, 1998, p. Al, and “Russians Admit Firms Met Iraqis,”Washington Post, February 18, 1998, p. A16.