Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market Part 2 - best response of a producer-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market Part 2 - best response of a producer

Published:2016-09-20 Issue:6 Volume:66 Page:1027-1053
ISSN:0233-1934
Container-title:Optimization
language:en
Short-container-title:Optimization

Author:

Aussel D.,Bendotti P.,Pištěk M.

Funder

FMJH Program Gaspard Monge in optimization and operation research

European Regional Development Fund and the Ministry of Education,Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic under the Regional Innovation Center for Electrical Engineering (RICE)

Publisher

Informa UK Limited

Subject

Applied Mathematics,Management Science and Operations Research,Control and Optimization

Link

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02331934.2016.1227982

Reference12 articles.

1. Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices

2. On Cournot Equilibria in Electricity Transmission Networks

3. Monopolistic competition in electricity networks with resistance losses

4. Cournot versus Supply Functions: What does the data tell us?

5. Electricity spot market with transmission losses

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