1. There is a precedent in the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system used prior to the NPT and used currently outside the NPT system. See B. Sanders,Safeguards against Nuclear Proliferation(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1975), p. 15: This system “implies the principle that the supply of any nuclear item shouldneverfurther any military purpose and thus that nuclear material produced by means of or with the help of such items should also come under safeguards, and that further generations of material issuing directly or indirectly from the produced material should also be covered…. Safeguards may be stipulated to follow material, wherever it is exported…. Safeguards follow generation after generation of produced material…. If this principle of ‘derivation’ or ‘contamination’… is closely adhered to, it would, through the use of safeguarded material and facilities in conjunction with unsafeguarded items, lead to a ‘proliferation of safeguards' from which eventually an international safeguards web could be spun through which little, if any, unsafe-guarded material would be able to escape.”