Government controlling ownership and CEO compensation incentives: evidence from China-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Government controlling ownership and CEO compensation incentives: evidence from China

Published:2022-09-08 Issue: Volume: Page:1-19
ISSN:0003-6846
Container-title:Applied Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Applied Economics

Author:

Hui Zhiyang¹,Fang Hongyan²

Affiliation:

1. School of Finance, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing, Nan’an District, China

2. School of Finance, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Songjiang District, Shanghai, China

Funder

China Scholarship Council

National Natural Science Foundation of China

Publisher

Informa UK Limited

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Link

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00036846.2022.2115973

Reference48 articles.

1. Bae, K. H., Z. Gong, and W. Tong 2020. “Restricting CEO Pay Backfires: Evidence from China.” European Corporate Governance Institute–Finance Working Paper, (670).

2. The Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform: Empirical Evidence from China

3. Privatization and stock market liquidity

4. The role of state and foreign owners in corporate risk-taking: Evidence from privatization

5. Political Promotion, CEO Incentives, and the Relationship Between Pay and Performance

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