1. In passing, we might note that (iii) cannot be answered by saying that the ‘ought’ qualifies only what can be done. This would serve only a celebration, not an examination, of the Doctrine. Nor can (iii) be answered by saying simply that the ‘ought’ qualifies only thekindof thing people can do. (Cf.e.g., SesonskeValue and ObligationNew York City1964 36 37 Any act, whether or not it can be done, is of some act kind that people can do: if necessary we can form a “new” act kind composed of any given act and acts people can do. Nor can (iii) be answered by saying that if an act is of a kind that cannot be done, then it is not qualified by this ‘ought’. Any act that cannot be done belongs to many such act kinds:e.g., the one composed of just those acts which cannot be done.