1. See Margaret Cowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 19451952, vol. I: Policy Making, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974, for the excellent official history.
2. Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to "The Peloponnesian War" trns. Richard Crawley, rev. edn., New York: Free Press, 1996, p. 43.
3. The U.S. Government was mindful of how its (World War I) war loans had not been repaid in the 1920s, it was at the peak of its relative influence over Britain, and some of its members harbored vague millennial hopes for the Intel-nationalization of atomic energy. These and other factors were not well comprehended in contemporary Britain. London's view was that the British Empire literally had bankrupted itself for the common cause (before the forced U.S. entry into the war), and that as a full cofounder of what became the Manhattan Project it was entitled morally and legally to a full share in the Project's outcome. The Anglo-American "special relationship" did not look very special in 1945 and 1946.
4. Michael Quintan, Thinking about Nuclear Weapons, London: Royal United Services Institution, 1997, p. 19.
5. George Robertson (Secretary of State for Defence), The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays, London: The Stationery Office, July 1998, p. 5-9.