Affiliation:
1. Danmarks National Bank (email: ).
2. University of California, Berkeley (email: ).
3. Paris School of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, NBER and EU Tax Observatory (email: ).
Abstract
We show that the fiscal authorities of high-tax countries can lack the incentives to combat profit shifting to tax havens. Instead, they have incentives to focus their enforcement efforts on relocating profits booked by multinationals in other high-tax countries, crowding out the enforcement on transactions that shift profits to tax havens, and reducing the global tax payments of multinational companies. The predictions of our model are motivated and supported by the analysis of two new datasets: the universe of transfer price corrections conducted by the Danish tax authority, and new cross-country data on international tax enforcement. (JEL E62, F23, H25, H26, H87, K34)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
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