Affiliation:
1. University of Pennsylvania and NBER (email: )
2. Amazon (email: )
3. University of Southern California and NBER (email: )
Abstract
We study hassle costs versus information provision in explaining how prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) decrease opioid prescribing. PDMPs aim to reduce opioid prescribing through information provision but may also unintentionally affect prescribing through the hassle of required record checks. We analyze Kentucky’s landmark PDMP to disentangle these two mechanisms. Hassle costs reduce opioid prescribing across the board, including to opioid-naïve patients; however, physicians continue to prescribe opioids to patients who would benefit the most. Although information also affects prescribing, hassle costs explain the majority of the decline. Introducing a cost to prescribing high-risk medications improves the targeting of treatment. (JEL H75, I11, I12, I18, L65)
Publisher
American Economic Association