Affiliation:
1. Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (email: )
2. Monash University (email: )
Abstract
We analyze the design of a mechanism to extract a ranking of individuals according to a unidimensional characteristic, such as ability or need. Individuals, connected on a social network, only have local information about the ranking. We show that a planner can construct an ex post incentive compatible and efficient mechanism if and only if every pair of friends has a friend in common. We characterize the windmill network as the sparsest social network for which the planner can always construct a complete ranking. (JEL D11, D82, D83, D85, O12, Z13)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Cited by
3 articles.
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