Affiliation:
1. Department of Economics, Duke University (email: )
Abstract
Centralized admissions are an integral part of parental school choice programs. Most districts use a version of the deferred acceptance algorithm to assign applicants to schools. Centralized admissions produce data with quasi-experimental variation in student assignment that is integral in program evaluation. Recent developments in research design consider the basic version of the deferred acceptance algorithm. However, most districts adapt advanced versions of the deferred acceptance algorithm to implement their diversity policy in admissions, such as favoring applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds in lottery tie-breaking. We develop research design for data from the deferred acceptance algorithm with weighted lotteries.
Publisher
American Economic Association
Reference5 articles.
1. Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation
2. Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design
3. Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, and Inkoo Back. 2024a. "Replication data for: Research Design with Weighted Lotteries in School Choice." American Economic Association [publisher], Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]. https://doi. org/10.1257/E198167V1.
4. Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, and Inkoo Back. 2024b. "Research Design Meets Diversity in School Choice." Unpublished.
5. The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects