Affiliation:
1. Faculty of Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi (email: )
2. Department of Economics and Nuffield College, University of Oxford (email: )
3. Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University (email: )
Abstract
We test between cooperative and extractive theories of the origins of government. We use river shifts in southern Iraq as a natural experiment, in a new archeological panel dataset. A shift away creates a local demand for a government to coordinate because private river irrigation needs to be replaced with public canals. It disincentivizes local extraction as land is no longer productive without irrigation. Consistent with a cooperative theory of government, a river shift away led to state formation, canal construction, and the payment of tribute. We argue that the first governments coordinated between extended households which implemented public good provision. (JEL D72, H11, H41, N45, N55, Q15)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
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