Affiliation:
1. Department of Economics, Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA, 94305 (email: )
Abstract
I study expertise acquisition in a model of trading under asymmetric information. I propose and implement a method to measure r, the ratio of the marginal social value to the marginal private value of expertise. This can be decomposed into three sufficient statistics: traders’ average profits, the fraction of bad assets among traded assets, and the elasticity of good assets traded with respect to capital inflows. I measure r = 0.16 for the junk bond underwriting market. Since this is less than 1, it implies that marginal investments in expertise destroy surplus. (JEL D82, G11, G14, G21, L84)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Cited by
14 articles.
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